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LEGISLATIVE REFORM OR LEGALIZED THEFT?:
WHY CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE MUST BE
OUTLAWED IN OHIO
ALEX HALLER*
ABSTRACT
Civil asset forfeiture is a legal method for law enforcement to deprive United
States citizens of their personal property with little hope for its return. With varying
degrees of legal protection at the state level, Ohio legislators must encourage national
policy reform by outlawing civil asset forfeiture in Ohio. Ohio Revised Code Section
2981.05 should be amended to outlaw civil asset forfeiture by requiring a criminal
conviction prior to allowing the seizure of an individual’s property. This Note
proposes two plans of action that will restore Ohio resident’s property rights back to
those originally afforded in the United States Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[Civil asset forfeiture] has become a tool for unscrupulous law
enforcement officials, acting without due process, to profit by destroying
the livelihood of innocent individuals, many of whom never recover the
lawful assets taken from them. When the rights of the innocent can be so
easily violated, no one’s rights are safe.” 1
In April 2013, police stopped James Leonard in Texas for a traffic violation. 2 A
subsequent search of the vehicle lead law-enforcement officers to a safe in the trunk,
which contained $201,100 and a bill of sale for a Pennsylvania home. 3 Law
enforcement officials immediately seized the money, citing their belief that the funds
were “substantially connected to criminal activity,” including the sale of narcotics, a
practice permitted under the state’s civil asset forfeiture laws. 4 James Leonard’s
mother (“Ms. Leonard”) claimed to be the rightful owner of the money from the house
sale and sued the government to regain it.5 Ms. Leonard appealed an adverse trial court
verdict, where unfortunately the Texas Trial Court’s holding was affirmed. 6 The
Appellate Court agreed that Ms. Leonard’s testimony regarding her ownership of the
property was not sufficient and she did not meet the criteria for the innocent owner
1 REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM 15 (2016), https://prodcdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf.
2 Ewan Watt & Jordan Richardson, Justice Thomas Defends Victims of ‘Policing for
Profit’, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445644/civilasset-forfeiture-clarence-thomas-asks-if-its-constitutional; $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State,
No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7341, at *1 (Tex. App. July 16, 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing in the judgment on procedural
grounds but seriously questioning “whether modern civil –forfeiture statutes can be squared
with the Due Process Clause and our Nation’s history”).
3

Watt & Richardson, supra note 2; Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847.

Watt & Richardson, supra note 2; Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847 (holding the “suspicious
circumstances” of the stop and contradictory stories about the money provided by the
passengers of the vehicle was sufficient for the government to show “by a preponderance of the
evidence that the money was either the proceeds of a drug sale or intended to be used in such a
sale”).
4

5

$201,000.00 U.S. Currency, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7341, at *2.

6

Id. at *10.
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defense.7 Ms. Leonard subsequently appealed her case to the United States Supreme
Court challenging the constitutionality of the procedures used to adjudicate the seizure
of her property.8 Specifically, Ms. Leonard argued that the Due Process Clause9 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required the state of Texas
to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance
of the evidence.10 Due to procedural issues, the Supreme Court declined to hear her
case, leaving her with little recourse to see the money again. 11
Although the prior case occurred in Texas, civil asset forfeiture is not a practice
Ohioans are fully protected from. 12 In fact, Ohioans are often subjected to the same
kind of civil asset forfeiture as Ms. Leonard in Texas. Take Ricardo Fletcher for
example. During November 2015, Fletcher attempted to ascertain a friend’s
whereabouts by leveraging GPS tracking on his phone. 13 The search ultimately lead
Fletcher to a bloody vehicle with its windows broken on a street in Cleveland, Ohio. 14
Immediately upon making this discovery, Fletcher contacted law enforcement. 15 The
following day, Fletcher returned to the scene and while conversing with a woman,
both of them noticed a gun in their vicinity and subsequently contacted police. 16 When
police arrived, Fletcher consented to a search of his vehicle and provided a DNA
sample upon law enforcement’s request. 17 Following the search of his vehicle, police
located and seized $20,000 in cash that belonged to Fletcher.18 No indictment or
charges of any kind were ever filed.19 Nor were any forfeiture proceedings, civil or
Id. at *11 (“The innocent owner defense requires a person whose property has been
seized for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she: ‘(a) acquired or
perfected her ownership interest before or during the act or omission giving rise to forfeiture;
and (b) did not know and reasonably should not have known of that act or omission.’”).
7

8

Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
9

10

Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847.

11 Id. at 850 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that as Ms. Leonard raised her due process
claims for the first time in the Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Appeals lacked the
opportunity to address them in the first instance).
12 See Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture
Cases,
FORBES
(Jan.
4,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-now-requires-criminalconvictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#172fbac755cf.
13 In re Seizure of Approximately $20,000 U.S. Currency, No. 104850, 2017 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1451, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017).
14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at *3.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

3

298

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:295

criminal, initiated against him.20 Fletcher complied with all of law enforcement’s
demands during the ongoing investigation.21 Yet, he still had his life savings seized
and found himself navigating Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture laws in an attempt to reclaim
it.22 After two years in the legal system, Fletcher received an appellate verdict in his
favor, affirming the trial court’s holding requiring law enforcement to return his
$20,000.23
Each year, the United States’ government seizes hundreds of millions of dollars in
cash and property prior to establishing a legal owner’s guilt or innocence. 24 Law
enforcement agencies use federal and state forefeiture laws to perform these seizures
and strip American citizens of their property. Civil asset forfeiture, also referred to as
civil forfeiture, has become so wide-spread that by 2014, law enforcement officers
took more property “legally” than all home and office burglaries combined. 25 Under
these laws, the government can seize an individual’s cash or property on the mere
suspicion that it is connected to criminal activity; no actual proof is required. 26
Additionally, in most cases, no charges or convictions against an individual are
required for law enforcement to seize the property. 27
Once property has been seized, property owners must traverse through the legal
system in their attempt to reclaim it, absent the right to counsel as afforded in a
criminal trial.28 A report by the Institute of Justice found that 87% of forfeitures were
civil, not criminal, due to dismissed charges.29 “It’s troubling that 87% of the time the
conviction appears to be irrelevant,” declared Lisa Knepper, co-author of the Institute
of Justice report.30 The report’s statistics illustrate law enforcement’s favoritism
towards conducting cash and property seizures under the lower standards of evidence

20

Id.

21 Id. at *9 (“[T]he state only made a bare assertion that the investigation was ongoing and
that Fletcher was a person of interest, without presenting any evidence of a current ongoing
investigation regarding the homicide and Fletcher.”).
22

Id. at *2.

Id. at *9 (holding the trial court properly granted Fletcher’s motion for the return of the
seized funds).
23

24

Dick Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INSTITUTE
JUSTICE 5 (2d ed. Nov. 2015), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-forprofit-2nd-edition.pdf.
FOR

25 Alex Emmons, Jeff Sessions Wants to Make “Legalized Theft” Great Again, INTERCEPT
(July 20, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/07/20/jeff-sessions-wants-to-make-legalizedtheft-great-again/.
26

Id.; Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2.

27

Emmons, supra note 25.

28

Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12.

29 Nathan Pemberton, Report: Law Enforcement Is on a Property-and-Cash-Seizure Binge
and
Just
Can’t
Get
Enough,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Nov.
10,
2015),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/11/police-seizing-more-money-than-ever.html.
30

Id.
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required by civil forfeiture proceedings as compared to criminal. 31 Not surprisingly,
the same study found that 88% of Department of Justice civil forfeitures were never
challenged.32 Reasons for not challenging a civil forfeiture in court can range from the
“inability to afford a lawyer,” to “miss[ing the] deadline to file a claim,” which results
in the property in question being presumed “guilty” and permanently taken from its
owner.33 Lawmakers should see a desperate need for civil asset forfeiture policy
reform when statistics show for every ten forfeitures, fewer than two property owners
ever see a day in court.34
Proponents of civil asset forfeiture see it as a method to thwart criminal enterprises
and prevent drug trafficking, as it allows the seizure of cash and other assets. 35 It is
also arguably an efficient method because it allows law enforcement agencies to use
seized proceeds to further battle illegal activity. 36 Law enforcement agencies are able
to direct the cash and proceeds of property seized towards law enforcement purposes,
therefore harming criminals economically and helping law enforcement financially. 37
While these goals sound virtuous in theory, statistics show civil forfeiture laws have
allowed the spread of an aggressive brand of policing that has spurred the seizure of
hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from motorists and others never charged with
crimes.38 A Washington Post investigation found that thousands of people have been
31

See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.

32

Pemberton, supra note 29.

33

Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12. The report highlights the varying state civil
forfeiture litigation processes and argues that citizens do not have much of an option to go
without legal representation in a civil forfeiture case:
Illinois offers a particularly egregious example of how civil forfeiture laws discourage
people from even trying to get their property back. In Illinois, to challenge a seizure in
court, property owners must first pay a bond of $100 or 10 percent of the property’s
value, whichever is greater. The only exceptions are for personal property worth more
than $150,000 and for real property. Id. If owners challenge and lose, they must pay the
full cost of the civil forfeiture proceedings, including the government’s legal costs, and
give up the full value of the bond. Even if they win, they lose 10 percent of the bond on
top of whatever attorney costs they accrued.
Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12.
34

See Pemberton, supra note 29.

35

Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-andseize/?utm_term=.cd5c70cf8cd5.

6,

2014),

36

Marian Williams et al., Policing for Profit the Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INSTITUTE
JUSTICE
25
(March
2010),
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf.
FOR

37 German Lopez, Jeff Sessions Is Letting Police Take More People’s Stuff Even if They
Aren’t Convicted of a Crime, VOX (July 19, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/7/18/15985810/jeff-sessions-civil-asset-forfeiture; see also Sallah, supra note 35.
38 Sallah, supra note 35; see also Nick Sibilla, Cops in Texas Seize Millions By ‘Policing
for
Profit,’
FORBES
(June
5,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/06/05/cops-in-texas-seize-millions-bypolicing-for-profit/#354c51071a81 (“Between 2001 and 2007, law enforcement agencies seized
and kept over 35,000 cars, homes and electronics, forfeiting more than $280 million. District
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forced to fight legal battles that can last more than a year. 39 Due to the uncertainty as
to whether their money will be returned, most property owners walk away and cut
their losses.40
Civil asset forfeiture has been employed for centuries under various justifications,
providing tens of thousands of Americans little recourse to retrieve lawful property
that never should have been the subject of a seizure.41 Civil asset forfeiture is a
violation of an individual’s constitutional property rights afforded by the Article I,
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution42 and violation of the Due Process Clause 43 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This practice further
violates the procedural presumption of “innocence until proven guilty” afforded in
criminal trials, which makes the American justice system so unique. As civil asset
forfeiture laws generally place the burden of proof on the owner of the property and
impose lower standards on law enforcement officers for seizing property, those who
cannot afford to attend court and reclaim their property are more heavily impacted by
these practices.44 To restore Ohio citizen’s property rights to those afforded within the
United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, various subsections of section
2981 of the Ohio Revised Code, must be further amended to ban civil asset forfeiture
by requiring a criminal conviction prior to permitting forfeiture proceedings.
Additionally, greater reporting requirements must be imposed on Ohio law
enforcement agencies to provide the public with transparency into their forfeiture
activities.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief history of civil asset
forfeiture law in the United States and gives a high-level overview of current state of
federal and state civil asset forfeiture laws. Part III outlines Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture
laws under the Ohio Revised Code and highlights the major changes resulting from
the legislative reform that took effect in 2017. Although Ohio’s forfeiture reform was
a step in the right direction, this Note argues Ohio’s legislators can go further in their
protection of the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution by further
amending these laws. Part IV outlines a proposal for reform to Ohio’s civil forfeiture
laws that adheres to the constitutional principles outlined by our founding fathers.
attorneys have used these forfeiture funds on ridiculous purchases, including visiting casinos, a
vacation to Hawaii and a margarita machine, as seen in the video below.”).
39

Sallah, supra note 35.

40

Id.

41

Id.

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.”). Ohio adopted this
identical language from the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”).
42

43

See supra text accompanying note 9.

44

Sallah, supra note 35 (stating that the burden shifts to the owners to regain their property,
meaning those who cannot afford attorneys are in trouble).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/9

6

2019]

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OR LEGALIZED THEFT?

301

Lastly, Part V offers a brief conclusion to the Note and encourages Ohio citizens to
demand civil asset forfeiture be outlawed in Ohio in an effort to continue paving the
way for reform across the United States.
II. BACKGROUND: CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. A Brief History of Civil Asset Forfeiture
Civil asset forfeiture is a legal process employed by law enforcement officers to
seize assets from individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activity without
necessarily charging the property owners with wrongdoing. The difference between
criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings is well described by Supreme Court Justice
Thomas in his concurring opinion in Leonard v. Texas:
When a state wishes to punish one of its citizens, it ordinarily proceeds
against the defendant personally (known as “in personam”), and in many
cases it must provide the defendant with full criminal procedural
protections. Nevertheless, . . . this Court permits prosecutors
seeking forfeiture to proceed against the property (known as “in rem”) and
to do so civilly. In rem proceedings often enable the government to seize
the property without any predeprivation judicial process and to
obtain forfeiture of the property even when the owner is personally
innocent (though some statutes, including the one here, provide for an
innocent-owner defense). Civil proceedings often lack certain procedural
protections that accompany criminal proceedings, such as the right to a jury
trial and a heightened standard of proof.45
In a civil forfeiture case, the lawsuit is against the property in question not the
individual to whom the property actually belongs. 46 In these cases, the property owner
is a third-party claimant and cases are tried in accordance with civil procedure
requirements.47 A civil forfeiture proceeding is comprised of two separate actions
conducted by various government officials. 48 First, is the actual seizure of the cash or
property in question.49 Second, is the potential forfeiture of the property based on court
proceedings.50 Seizure occurs when law enforcement officials confiscate the property
suspected to be involved in criminal activity from the property owner. 51 There are very
45

Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847–48 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).

46

Jason Snead, Civil Asset Forfeiture: 7 Things You Should Know, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/civil-asset-forfeiture-7things-you-should-know; see also Sallah, supra note 35 (The seized object is listed as the
defendant in the civil action. “Civil asset forfeiture law is among the more unusual areas of
American jurisprudence. It does not involve evidence of a crime or criminal charges. It is a civil
action against an object, such as currency or a boat, rather than a person.”).
47

See generally Snead, supra note 46.

48

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 8.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.
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few limits on what types of property may be seized by law enforcement. 52 Reports
have shown that items seized ranged “from cash, vehicles, airplanes, jewelry, homes,
musical instruments, farm implements, home furnishings, electronics, and more.” 53
Under federal law, if the owner of the property in question would like to reclaim it,
the owner must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the property in
question was not used in criminal activity, thus turning the presumption of innocence
on its head.54 Once a civil asset has been seized, the appropriate prosecutor’s office
will file a civil action against the property in order to forfeit it permanently.55
Therefore, civil asset forfeiture not only deprives a property owner of the use of
his or her personal property, but it also requires the owner to expend time and
resources to seek the return of the property in a court of law. When contesting federal
forfeiture proceedings, a property owner must meet the preponderance of the evidence
standard in proving that the property in question was not used in criminal activity.56
Failing to appear to contest asset forfeiture proceedings is grounds for permanent
removal of the asset from the property owner. 57 Whether the federal government
should be able to take possession of an individual’s property in the absence of a
judicial finding of guilt has been debated since before American independence. 58
Researchers have found that civil asset forfeiture dates back to British maritime
laws in the 1600s, where the practice was used as a way to take possession of
contraband goods from ships’ owners that were, in many cases, located thousands of
miles away and could not be easily prosecuted.59 Journalist Michael Krieger noted,
“[i]n the Colonial period, the English Crown issued ‘writs of assistance’ that permitted
customs officials to enter homes or vessels and seize whatever they deemed
contraband.”60 Legal scholars have documented how these forfeiture practices angered
colonists, who saw the writs as “unreasonable searches and seizures” which deprived
52

Id.

53

Id.

Id. Preponderance of the evidence is required in a civil case, as compared with “beyond
a reasonable doubt,” which is a more severe test of evidence required to convict in a criminal
trial.
54

55

Id.

56

Id. at 16.

57

Snead, supra note 46.

58 Michael Krieger, Why You Should Never, Ever Drive Through Tenaha Texas, LIBERTY
BLITZKRIEG (Aug. 7, 2013), https://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2013/08/07/why-you-should-neverever-drive-through-tenaha-texas/#more-7386.
59 Id.;
Sarah
Stillman,
Taken,
NEW
YORKER
(Aug.
12,
2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken; see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct.
848, 848–49 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that an English practice of requiring
forfeiture of offending objects used in violation of customs and revenue “took hold in the United
States,” where the “First Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs
offenses to forfeiture. Other early statutes also provided for the forfeiture of private ships. These
early statutes permitted the government to proceed in rem under the fiction that the thing itself,
rather than the owner, was guilty of the crime. And, because these suits were in rem rather than
in personam, they typically proceeded civilly rather than criminally.”) (citations omitted).
60

Krieger, supra note 58.
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persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process” and were among the key
grievances that triggered the American Revolution.61
1. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Forfeiture in its modern form began with federal statutes passed in the 1970s,
targeted at organized-crime bosses and drug lords.62 Later amendments allowed the
seizure of anything thought to have been purchased with tainted funds, whether it was
connected to the commission of a crime.63 Even then, forfeiture remained an infrequent
resort until 1984 when Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984 (“CCCA”).64 The CCCA included a provision that permitted local law
enforcement agencies to receive up to 80% of the proceeds derived from civil
forfeitures obtained in joint operations with federal authorities. 65 This procedure
became known as “equitable sharing.”66 Civil forfeiture allowed federal and local
governments to “extract swift penalties from white-collar criminals and offer
restitution to victims of fraud,” argued Journalist Sarah Stillman. 67
Prior to the enactment of the CCCA, all proceeds from civil forfeiture proceedings
were directed to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. 68 After passing the CCCA, all
federal forfeiture revenue is returned to the very agencies charged with enforcing the
laws, thus heavily incentivizing civil forfeiture efforts. 69 For the first time,
governmental agencies were permitted to receive a substantial financial benefit and
use those funds with very limited restrictions.70 Additionally, with the creation of
“equitable sharing,” state and local agencies coordinating forfeiture efforts with the
federal government are entitled to receive a portion of the proceeds resulting from the
61

Id. However, there is still skepticism regarding how heavily this historical practice should
influence modern day forfeiture procedures. See, e.g., Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 849 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“In the absence of this historical practice, the Constitution presumably would
require the Court to align its distinct doctrine governing civil forfeiture with its doctrines
governing other forms of punitive state action and property deprivation. I am skeptical that this
historical practice is capable of sustaining, as a constitutional matter, the contours of modern
practice, for two reasons.”) (citation omitted).
62

Stillman, supra note 59.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Shawn Cantor et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence from
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, NAT’L. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Sept.
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23873.
66

Id.

67

Stillman, supra note 59.

68

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2.

69 Id. at 5 (“In 1986, the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund took in $93.7
million in revenue from federal forfeitures. By 2014, annual deposits had reached $4.5 billion—
a 4,667 percent increase. The forfeiture funds of the DOJ and Treasury Department together
took in nearly $29 billion from 2001 to 2014, and combined annual revenue grew 1,000 percent
over the period.”).

Id. at 10 (explaining that law enforcement was “using funds to do everything from
purchase vehicles to paying overtime”).
70
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forfeited assets.71 Soon, states began to follow Congress’s lead by broadening their
own forfeiture laws, while creating incentives to “police for profit.” 72 According to
the Department of Justice, in 2013, the Asset Forfeiture Fund collected more than $2
billion from criminal and civil asset forfeiture. 73
B. Attempts at Federal Forfeiture Reform
1. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
The CCCA governing forfeited assets has heavily influenced police incentives and
granted what some argued to be unconstitutional discretion under the law. 74 Henry
Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated, in regard
to civil asset forfeiture law, “[u]nfortunately, I think I can say that our civil-assetforfeiture laws are being used in terribly unjust ways and are depriving innocent
citizens of their property with nothing that can be called due process.” 75 Just three
years later, on April 25, 2000, the 106th United States Congress passed the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), which modestly revised the Federal
criminal code “to establish general rules relating to civil forfeiture proceedings.” 76
Representative Henry Hyde sponsored CAFRA. 77 Critics of the reform noted that “it
left unchanged one of the most troublesome elements of the CCCA, law enforcement’s
ability to benefit financially from civil forfeiture.” 78
The most significant amendments to federal civil forfeiture proceedings after
CAFRA included: the establishment of a 90-day requirement for the Government to
file a complaint for forfeiture or return the property; providing enhanced protections
for those with standing to contest the forfeiture of the property, but are financially
unable to obtain representation by counsel, placing the burden of proof in civil
forfeitures on the Government;79 declaring that the “innocent owner” defense shall not
71

Id. at 26.

72

Id. at 10; see also Stillman, supra note 59.

73 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014); see also
Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2 (“The seeds of forfeiture abuse were sown in 1984 when Congress
expanded federal civil forfeiture laws and created a financial incentive for law enforcement to
forfeit property.”).
74 Kyla Dunn, Reining in Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs,
FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
75

Stillman, supra note 59.

76

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-85, 114 Stat. 202.

77

Id.

78

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 10.

Federal civil forfeiture proceedings still apply the “preponderance of the evidence test”
when determining whether the property in question was used in the commission of a crime.
However, CAFRA “[d]irects the Government, if its theory of forfeiture is that the property was
used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in such
commission, to establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the
offense.” See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-85, 114
Stat. 202.
79
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be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute; 80 directing that all civil forfeitures of real
property and interests in real property proceed as judicial forfeitures; and, enhancing
Department of Justice reporting requirements to Congress. 81
2. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014
Unfortunately, subsequent to the passage of CAFRA, state and local law
enforcement agencies continued to operate with lax controls surrounding their
officers’ forfeiture procedures.82 Studies have found when certain states were facing
fiscal crises, legislators expanded the reach of the state’s forfeiture statutes and
enabled law enforcement to use the revenues however they saw fit. 83 To respond to
criticisms and overbearing evidence of abuse, Congressmen Tim Walberg introduced
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014 in the House of Representatives.84 The
purpose of the bill is to strengthen personal property rights under the Fifth Amendment
and to ensure due process of law by reforming civil asset forfeiture laws. 85 The bill’s
supporters argue, under current law, that agencies like the Internal Revenue Service
and Department of Justice may take property suspected to be in connection with a
crime without charging the property owner of a crime—a clear violation of due
process.86 The bill was introduced “to restore the balance of power away from the
government and back to protecting individual rights and due process.”87
The bill’s most notable change to current asset forfeiture laws would include
raising the burden of proof for evaluating a forfeiture from a “preponderance of the
evidence,” to “clear and convincing evidence,” requiring the government to have more
concrete proof of the property’s connection to a crime. 88 The bill would also shift the
burden of proof for the “Innocent Owner Defense” from the owner of the property to
the government.89 It would further expand the reporting requirements for the
Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund, thereby enhancing the Department’s
reporting requirements to Congress. 90 In an attempt to defer to state regulations, the
bill requires the Department of Justice to ensure “any equitable sharing with local or
state agencies from forfeitures do not violate state laws or limitations.” 91 This
effectively bans the Department of Justice from sharing forfeitures with states that
80 It is important to note that while CAFRA affirmed a property owner’s right to declare
the innocent owner defense, under current federal law the burden is still on the claimant to prove
that he/she is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.
81

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 10.

82

Stillman, supra note 59.

83

Id.

84

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014).

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.
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prohibit civil forfeiture and subjecting the Department of Justice to state guidelines
for usage of those funds.92 Unfortunately, since being introduced in 2014, the bill only
has twenty cosponsors and was assigned for revision to the Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations Committee by the House Judiciary.93
3. Trump vs. Congress in Forfeiture Reform
In July 2017, the White House took a stance on civil forfeiture at the exact opposite
end of the spectrum from CAFRA and the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014
bill introduced into the House of Representatives.94 Donald Trump’s Justice
Department revived a federal program that gives state and local law enforcement more
power to seize property from people who have not been convicted of a crime. 95 The
Justice Department reopened a specific loophole that allows state and local police to
sidestep state laws through a practice known as adoptive forfeitures. 96 The loophole
allows state and local law enforcement to continue to pillage the property of citizens
even in the face of local bans on the practice, as long as they refer the case to federal
agencies after they seize property.97 “The loophole” had been a thirty-year policy of
the Department of Justice, until the Obama administration banned it in 2015.98
In an interesting turn of events, the House of Representatives approved an
amendment to the “Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act” that
would roll back the expansions of asset forfeiture under the Trump administration.99
The amendment is currently waiting to be voted on by the Senate. As any recent
attempt at federal reform has been stalled, States have elected to take regulation of
civil asset forfeiture practices into their own hands and continue to amend their asset
forfeiture policies and procedures.
C. The Various State Policies Regarding Civil Forfeiture
Almost all states and the District of Colombia have their own civil forfeiture laws,
which vary in required procedures and financial incentives. 100 When evaluating the
differences, it is most important to consider “the standard of proof that must be met to
forfeit the seized property and which party has the burden to prove innocence or
guilt.”101 State forfeiture laws range from those where nearly forty-percent of law
enforcement budgets are derived from forfeitures, to outright banning civil forfeiture
92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Emmons, supra note 25.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Zaid Jilani, In Surprise Vote, House Passes Amendment to Restrict Asset Forfeiture,
INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/12/in-surprise-vote-housepasses-amendment-to-restrict-asset-forfeiture/.
100

Id.

101

Id.
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by requiring a criminal conviction before a person’s property can be seized. 102 From
2010 to 2015, various news outlets released studies and articles highlighting how
wide-spread forfeiture has become in the United States and how most states’ laws
violated basic citizen property rights. 103 Thankfully, the investigative research
performed by constitutional rights activist groups did not fall on deaf ears and
lawmakers began to take note. As of 2015, a study found that “five states (New
Mexico, Nevada, Montana, Minnesota, and Michigan) and the District of Colombia
had substantively reformed civil asset forfeiture laws” to provide added protection to
property owners in accordance with the Constitution. 104 Despite a minority of states
electing to reform their civil asset forfeiture laws, the truth remains that federal and a
majority of state civil forfeiture regulations continue to put innocent property owners
at risk.105
In a study published in 2015, the Institute for Justice found that civil forfeiture far
outpaces criminal forfeiture. 106 The study noted that “[j]ust 13% of Department of
Justice forfeitures from 1997 to 2013 were criminal forfeitures; 87 percent were civil
forfeitures.”107 Further, among those civil forfeitures, eighty-eight percent took place
“administratively.”108 The study further found that “state and local law enforcement
participation with the federal government via ‘equitable sharing’” skyrocketed in
recent years and find it unlikely that this trend will reverse. 109 Lastly, the Institute
noted that “most state and federal civil asset forfeiture laws lack even basic
transparency requirements, leaving the public in the dark about most forfeiture
activity.”110
102

Stillman, supra note 59.

See, e.g., Sallah, supra note 35 (“To examine the scope of asset forfeiture since the terror
attacks, The Post analyzed a database of hundreds of thousands of seizure records at the Justice
Department, reviewed hundreds of federal court cases, obtained internal records from training
firms and interviewed scores of police officers, prosecutors and motorists.”); Carpenter, supra
note 23, at 3 (“This second edition of Policing for Profit highlights the continued need for
forfeiture reform. Updated grades for state and federal civil forfeiture laws find that protections
against unjust forfeitures still range from bad to worse, and too many laws incentivize revenue
generation over the impartial administration of justice. This edition also shows—with far more
extensive data than previously available—that law enforcement’s use of forfeiture continues to
grow. Furthermore, this second edition shines a spotlight on the appalling lack of transparency
in the use of forfeiture and its proceeds.”).
103

104

Carpenter, supra note 23, at 23.

105

Id. at 6.

106

Id. at 5.

107

Id.

108 Id. “Administrative forfeitures happen automatically when a property owner fails to
challenge a seizure in court,” meaning the cases are never heard before a judge and property
owners never see a day in court. Id.
109 Id. at 6 (“The Department of Justice announced new policies in January 2015 intended
to curb one type of equitable sharing—federal ‘adoptions’ of locally seized assets. But the
changes and subsequent clarifications largely left intact another vehicle for equitable sharing—
joint task forces and investigations involving federal law enforcement.”).
110

Id. at 7.
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Unfortunately, deriving in-depth state statistics regarding forfeiture activity is
impossible due to the lack of public reporting requirements. 111 However, the Institute
determined in 2012 (the last year the most consistent data was available) alone, “state
and local agencies in 26 states and the District of Colombia took in more than $254
million through forfeiture.”112 The state of Texas led the states in forfeiture collections
with “$46 million, followed by Arizona with $43 million, and Illinois with nearly $20
million.”113 Due to the required filings, fee payments, and court appearances required
to contest civil asset forfeitures, many property owners never make it to court.114
Another significant reason property owners fail to contest forfeitures relates to the low
value of property frequently at stake.115 “For property worth less than $200, a mere 3
percent of owners attempt to retrieve it, but as the value of seized property increases
so do the percentage of owners willing to contest an attempted forfeiture.” 116 If
property owners choose to take on the daunting task of reclaiming their property in
court, state laws often only require prosecutors to meet low standards of evidence due
to the civil nature of the lawsuit.117
As part of the study, the Institute assigned grades to each state’s civil forfeiture
laws, after evaluating the threat the laws posed to innocent property owners. 118 Three
fundamental elements of civil forfeiture laws were examined by the Institute when
calculating grades: (1) “the financial incentive”; (2) “the standard of proof the
government must meet to forfeit the property”; and, (3) “whether the burden to prove
innocence or guilt is on the innocent third-party owners or the government.” 119 A high
grade (i.e., an “A”) from the Institute signified “laws that limit or ban forfeiture
proceeds directed to law enforcement and offer strong protections to citizens against
unjust forfeitures.” 120 As a result of investigations performed, an astounding thirtyfive states, or seventy-percent, received a grade of D+ or lower.121 Even worse, the

111

Id. at 11.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 12.

115 Id. (“[T]he Institute for Justice was able to obtain property-level forfeiture data for 10
states from 2012, allowing median property values to be calculated. In those states, the median
value of forfeited property ranged from $451 in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah.”).
116 Id. (“In Minnesota, for instance, law enforcement took 34,000 pieces of property,
including vehicles, cash and homes, between 2003 and 2010—the equivalent of one piece of
property from every other family in St. Paul, the state capital. Yet over one six-month period,
66 percent of forfeitures went unchallenged by property owners. Overall, from 2003 to 2010,
Minnesotans saw the return of their property in just 10 percent of cases.”).
117

Id.

118

Id. at 14.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 6.

121

Id.
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Institute found that Federal civil forfeiture laws were some of the worst offenders,
earning a D-.122
1. Financial Incentives for Law Enforcement
Civil asset forfeiture laws create financial incentives for law enforcement when
the proceeds of forfeited property may be used by the agency enforcing the law with
little to no restrictions on how those proceeds may to be spent.123 As of 2015, only
seven states and the District of Colombia prohibit law enforcement from accessing
proceeds from forfeited assets.124 The remaining forty-three states permit law
enforcement to use anywhere from forty-five to one-hundred percent of the proceeds
from forfeited property at their total discretion. 125
2. Standard of Proof
Those property owners who ultimately decide to challenge a pending forfeiture are
at a significant disadvantage.126 That disadvantage is a direct result of the low standard
of proof a prosecutor must meet under civil forfeiture laws. 127 As of 2015, thirty-one
states and the federal government apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard
for proof of all civil asset forfeitures, making it the most common standard
nationally.128 This standard requires law enforcement to show that the property in
question was more likely than not connected to a crime and is often referred to as the
“51 percent standard.”129 There are two states, namely Massachusetts and North
Dakota, that maintain an even lower standard—requiring only probable cause to
forfeit an individual’s property.130 On the contrary, in an effort to protect their citizen’s
constitutional rights, “a growing number of states have begun demanding a higher
standard of proof for civil asset forfeitures.” 131 The lower the standard of proof, the
122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. Note, at the time the study was performed, Ohio permitted one-hundred percent of
the value of forfeited assets to be used at law enforcement discretion.
126

Id. at 16.

127

Id. (explaining that the standard of proof is what the government must show to win a
civil forfeiture case and dictates how convincing the government’s evidence must be to a judge).
128

Id.

Id. (“[M]eaning the evidence must be a bit more than 50-50-or slightly better than a coin
flip-in favor of the government, a much lower hurdle than beyond a reasonable doubt”).
129

130 Id. (“Probable cause is the same low evidentiary standard that police must meet in order
to make an arrest, carry out a search or seize property in the first place”).
131

Id. at 17. As Carpenter summarized:

North Carolina requires criminal convictions in most cases. California sets a standard
of beyond a reasonable doubt to forfeit most kinds of property, with a conviction
required . . . . In 2015, New Mexico abolished civil forfeiture. It now requires a criminal
conviction with proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all forfeitures; after securing a
conviction, the government must prove in the same criminal proceeding that seized
property is connected to the crime by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ a standard lower
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easier the civil forfeiture case becomes for the government to win, resulting in a more
difficult case for property owners.132
3. Burden to Prove Innocence or Guilt
Currently, only ten states and the District of Colombia actually require the
government to prove the property owner was involved in illegal activity prior to
forfeiting the property. 133 Depending on the state, property owners can be subject to
civil asset forfeiture without a criminal conviction or can lose their property when
another individual allegedly uses it during the commission of a crime. 134 In the
remaining forty states, the type of property involved determines which party has the
burden of proof.135
III. OHIO CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAW
This Note specifically proposes reform to Ohio civil asset forfeiture laws,
therefore, it is important to highlight the relevant Ohio Revised Code sections and
recent amendments thereof. Ohio enacted its first state forfeiture laws in 2007 with
Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised Code titled “Forfeiture.” 136 Ohio legislators made
few changes to the forfeiture laws initially enacted until gross abuse of power by law
enforcement was uncovered and reported by the media. 137 A study published in 2015
found that Ohio’s forfeiture laws were among the worst in the country, encouraging
legislative reform which passed and became effective in 2017.138 The study found
“that Ohio law enforcement acquired at least $25.7 million” in forfeitures based on
incomplete records provided by the Attorney General. 139 Additionally, the study
than reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of the evidence. Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada and Vermont now also demand criminal convictions, followed by
civil trials linking seized property to the crime by clear and convincing evidence.
Missouri requires a criminal conviction and proof by a preponderance of the evidence
that seized property is connected to the crime; Oregon law is similar for forfeitures of
personal property (which account for most forfeitures) but sets a higher standard of clear
and convincing evidence to forfeit real property. Six states—Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Michigan, New York and Utah—demand that the government provide clear
and convincing evidence of a property’s connection to criminal activity for most or all
civil forfeitures. The remaining states and the District of Columbia apply different
standards to different types of property or under different circumstances.
132

Id. at 18.

133

Id. at 20.

134

Id. at 18.

135

Id. at 20 (when the study was released in 2015, in Ohio the burden to prove innocence
was placed on the property owner. Subsequent to reform in Ohio, the burden to prove had
subsequently been placed on the government).
136

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981 (West 2017).

Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Police Can’t Keep Seized Property Until Charges Are Filed,
Under
Bill
That
Passed
Senate,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Dec.
9,
2016),
https://articles.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/12/civil_asset_forfeiture_reforms.amp.
137

138

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 116.

139 Id. at 116 (“Data used within the study included forfeitures from state and local agencies
provided to the Ohio attorney general and obtained by the Institute for Justice through an Ohio
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determined that Ohio law enforcement officials were among the worst offenders of
participating in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program, “ranking the
state 43rd nationally.”140
With little-to-no change in civil asset forfeiture laws in the federal realm, Ohio
government officials elected to take reform into their own hands. 141 In January 2017,
Governor Kasich signed various amendments into Ohio law governing asset
forfeiture.142 Under prior law, state and local law enforcement officials were permitted
to seize property without convicting or even charging an individual with a crime. 143
But now, Ohio joined seventeen other states in recent years that have overhauled their
civil asset forfeiture laws in response to media investigations and reports from civil
liberties groups that revealed shocking numbers of individuals who have had their
cash, cars, and homes seized.144 One of the most notable revisions to Section 2981, is
the requirement of a criminal conviction before law enforcement can permanently
confiscate property where property is valued under $15,000, effectively outlawing
civil asset forfeiture on property valued below this amount. 145 Ohio’s recent reform
also switches the burden of proof from the defendant to the government to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the property is connected to a crime.146
A. Financial Incentives for Ohio Law Enforcement
As previously discussed, financial incentives are created for law enforcement in
the civil forfeiture realm when the officials enforcing the laws are permitted to keep
the cash and proceeds of forfeited property and use it with little to no restrictions.
Recently amended Section 2981.05(D)(1) now bars all civil asset forfeiture
proceedings for proceeds147 less than $15,000. The Institute of Justice obtained
forfeiture for ten states and found the median amount seized in a civil forfeiture case
Public Records Act request. The Institute noted that several state agencies did not report to the
attorney general and several reports contained forfeited vehicles for which no value and/or
proceeds were listed. The lack of data regarding Ohio forfeitures is a result of the elimination
of the reporting requirement to the attorney general in 2012.”).
140

Id. at 117.

141

Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture Cases,
FORBES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-nowrequires-criminal-convictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#172fbac755cf.
142

Id.

143

C.J. Ciaramella, Ohio Legislature Passes Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform, REASON (Dec.
9, 2016), http://reason.com/blog/2016/12/09/ohio-legislature-passes-civil-asset-forf (noting the
original bill passed by the Ohio house of representatives would have eliminated asset forfeiture
altogether by barring forfeiture in cases where no conviction was obtained but was softened in
responses to concerns from law enforcement).
144

Id.

145

Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017).

146

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017); Ciaramella, supra note 143.

147

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.01(A)(11)(a) (West 2017). Section 2981.01 defines
“proceeds” as: “[i]n cases involving unlawful goods, services, or activities, ‘proceeds’ means
any property derived directly or indirectly from an offense.” Id. “‘Proceeds’ may include, but is
not limited to, money or any other means of exchange.” Id.
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“ranged from $451 in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah.” 148 Therefore, this $15,000 barrier
is likely to deter a significant amount of civil forfeiture proceedings that would have
otherwise consumed the state court’s time and resources.
Further, the legislature amended Section 2981.14(B) as follows:
A law enforcement agency or prosecuting authority shall not directly or
indirectly transfer or refer any property seized by the agency or authority
to any federal law enforcement authority or other federal agency for
purposes of forfeiture under federal law unless the value of the seized
property exceeds one hundred thousand dollars.149
By forbidding the transfer of property seized to be transferred to federal law
enforcement agencies unless it exceeds $100,000, this amendment actively
discourages participation in the “equitable sharing” program under federal law.
Surprisingly, Ohio lawmakers elected to not revise Section 2981.13(b) which still
allows for law enforcement agencies conducting the forfeitures to transfer all of the
cash and proceeds of forfeited property to “the law enforcement trust fund of the
prosecutor and to the following fund supporting the law enforcement agency that
substantially conducted the investigation.” 150 This leaves room for law enforcement
agencies to participate in forfeitures with the federal government exceeding statute
thresholds and keep the proceeds for discretionary use.
B. Standard of Proof
The current standard of proof required in Ohio for civil forfeiture proceedings is
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.151 Ohio raised the standard as part of
2017 reform from the “beyond a preponderance of the evidence” standard that is used
by a majority of states. 152 The preponderance of the evidence test is what most
generally refer to as a “51% test,” requiring a better chance (than not) that the property
in question was used in the commission of a crime. 153 “The clear and convincing
evidence test requires the government to prove that it is substantially more likely than
not that the property seized was used in a crime.” 154 Although there are no strict
percentage guidelines, this evidence standard is said to fall somewhere between fiftyone percent and ninety-nine percent certainty.155
148

Carpenter, supra note 23, at 169 (States for which data was reviewed included:
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming).
149

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 22981.14(B) (West 2017).

150

Id. § 2981.13(b).

151

Id. § 2981.05(D)(3).

152

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 150.

What Is “Clear and Convincing Evidence,” ROTTENSTEIN LAW GROUP LLP,
http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-is-clear-and-convincing-evidence/.
153

154

Id.

155

Id.
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C. The Government’s Burden to Prove Guilt
In accordance with Section 2981.05(D)(3), in civil forfeiture proceedings, “the
state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence” that the property
owner received the proceeds involved, the property owner knew or had reasonable
cause to believe the proceeds were derived from the commission of an offense, and
that the value of the property in question exceeds $15,000.156
D. “Reform” in Ohio – What’s Next?
Speaking on the floor of the Ohio Senate, Senator Kris Jordan said that while
abolishing civil forfeiture would be “ideal,” the bill still “moves us in the right
direction.”157 The question is, does it move us far enough in the right direction? Is this
“policy reform” really in line with the expectations of United States citizens and more
specifically Ohio constituents? According to a poll last year by the Cato Institute,
eighty-four percent of Americans oppose property seizures from people not convicted
of a crime.158 Federal elected officials are recognizing the concerns of their
constituents, but still failing to fully address them in an attempt to appease law
enforcement officials.159
While the reform to Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised Code is a step in the right
direction, the solution to restoring Ohio citizen’s property rights to those afforded via
the Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution is easy. Ohio must simply outlaw civil asset forfeiture
and forbid state officials from participating in “equitable sharing” programs with
federal law enforcement agencies. A common pain point lawmakers cite when civil
asset forfeiture reform is unsuccessful is the resistance from law enforcement officials
killing the bills.160 It is worth noting that the original bill passed by the Ohio House of
Representatives earlier in 2017 would have eliminated civil asset forfeiture altogether,
barring forfeiture in cases where no conviction was obtained, but it was softened in
response to concerns from law enforcement. 161 Part IV of this Note further
substantiates the need to ban civil asset forfeiture in Ohio and provides Ohio
Lawmakers with a “Plan B.”
IV. PROPOSAL FOR POLICY REFORM
Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture laws, while recently amended with property owner’s
rights in mind, do not provide Ohio citizens with sufficient property protections. 162
156

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2017).

157

Sibilla, supra note 141 (discussing the recent passage of civil asset forfeiture reform
passed in Ohio in 2017).
158

Emmons, supra note 25.

159

Carpenter, supra note 23, at 43.

160

Id. at 24; see also Ciaramella, supra note 143.

Emmons, supra note 25; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 24 (“A common refrain in
the states where reform efforts have been unsuccessful is that resistance from law enforcement
leaders killed the bills.”).
161

162 Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture Cases,
FORBES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-nowrequires-criminal-convictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#8b5853255cfa.
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Not only do they violate Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, but further
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. When an individual is deprived of his or her property temporarily, and
most times permanently, based on laws passed to appease law enforcement and evade
strict criminal standards of proof, one’s right to due process has been violated. To
restore fundamental property rights in balance with the Ohio Constitution, the United
States Constitution, and to promote judicial efficiency, Ohio must outlaw civil asset
forfeiture.
A. Plan A: Outlaw Civil Asset Forfeiture in Ohio
Ohio’s civil forfeiture laws pose a significant threat to the property rights of its
citizens.163 These laws encourage law enforcement “to favor the pursuit of property
over the pursuit of justice,” and typically make it impossible to recover seized
property.164 Further, without meaningful transparency, the public has no way to hold
law enforcement accountable.165
To further protect Ohioan’s constitutional property rights, Ohio legislators should
amend Section 2981.05 of the Ohio Revised Code to outlaw civil asset forfeiture by
requiring a criminal conviction prior to allowing the seizure of an individual’s
property. If the property in question is “under suspicion of involvement of criminal
activity,” to promote due process and judicial efficiency, there should be a crime
charged for which the property in question can be tied back to. As The Washington
Post’s Tim Walberg eloquently stated, “[i]n a country founded on principles of due
process and property rights, no one should be comfortable with a system that allows
law enforcement to seize personal property without a finding of guilt or, in many cases,
even leveling a criminal charge.”166
Additionally, lawmakers should eliminate financial incentives for law enforcement
officials to take property. This can be accomplished by banning participation in
“equitable sharing” and requiring transparency in reporting of forfeiture activity and
spending. Ohio lawmakers should revise Section 2981.14(B) to forbid state and local
law enforcement agencies from participating in such programs with the federal
government. Lastly, all funds acquired from forfeitures should be directed to a type of
State General Fund, as opposed to the current process under Section 2981.13(b), which
permits one-hundred percent of forfeiture proceeds to be retained by the law
enforcement agency that seized the property. Laws permitting civil asset forfeiture
have allowed for corrupt practices to run rampant and have caused innocent
individuals to lose their property with little hope of return. Ohio must join the other

163

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 7.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Tim Walberg, Stopping the Abuse of Civil Forfeiture, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tim-walberg-an-end-to-the-abuse-of-civilforfeiture/2014/09/04/e7b9d07a-3395-11e4-9e920899b306bbea_story.html?utm_term=.6ffaf3ad6e8c.
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two167 states that have outlawed civil asset forfeiture completely to encourage reform
across the country.
1. Unconstitutionality of Section 2981 Under the Ohio Constitution
Using the legal system to evade higher standards of proof required for criminal
convictions to seize lawful property is a violation one’s right to freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Ohio Constitution. 168 Article I,
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, which has language almost identical to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, affords Ohioans coextensive
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. 169 Additionally, prior to the
issuance of a search warrant, the judicial officer issuing such a warrant must be
supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable
cause exists for the warrant.170
With the Constitution’s strong declaration of property rights and State
constitutions affording similar rights to their citizens, civil asset forfeiture laws seem
to be a direct violation of what the framers of the Constitution’s intended. Section
2981.05 of the Ohio Revised Code currently permits law enforcement officers to seize
property valued at $15,000 or more if they suspect the property was involved in the
commission of a crime or proceeds thereof. 171 This means there is no judicial process
prior to an individual’s asset being seized which is valued at or above that amount and
law enforcement officers will commence forfeiture proceedings in an attempt to
permanently deprive the individual from his or her asset(s). 172 To prevent the asset(s)
from automatically remaining in the government’s possession, the property owner
must go to court and contest the forfeiture. 173 Further, because this is a civil
proceeding, there is no right to an attorney or trial by jury of one’s peers. 174
The ability to deprive an individual of one’s property valued at $15,000 or greater
without actually charging anyone with committing a crime clearly constitutes an
“unreasonable seizure,” in direct violation of the Ohio Constitution. 175 Further,
throughout the trial proceedings, the government is only required to prove beyond
clear and convincing evidence that the property was used in the commission of a
crime.176 This is a lower standard that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard requires

167 Scott Shackford, This Map Details Whether Asset Forfeiture Laws in Your State Are
Good or Awful, REASON (June 9, 2015), https://reason.com/blog/2015/06/09/this-map-detailswhether-asset-forfeitur (the two states are New Mexico and North Carolina).
168

See supra text accompanying note 42.

169

See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 42.

170

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14.

171

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017).

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

See supra text accompanying note 44.

175

OHIO CONST. art. I § 14; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017).

176

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017).
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in criminal cases.177 The two standards of proof should be aligned, requiring the
government to prove the property was used in the commission of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. If an asset can be seized under civil asset forfeiture law if it is
“suspected to be involved in the commission of a crime,” the standard of proof should
align with that of a criminal trial.178
2. Unconstitutionality of Section 2981 Under the United States Constitution
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have long been argued to be violations of due
process afforded via the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 179
When faced with due process claims, the Supreme Court in particular has justified its
unique constitutional treatment of civil asset forfeiture largely by reference to a
discrete historical practice that existed when the United States was founded.180 As
Supreme Court Justice Thomas noted in Leonard v. Texas:
An English practice of requiring forfeiture of offending objects used in
violation of customs and revenue laws “took hold in the United States,”
where the “First Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved
in customs offenses to forfeiture.” Other early statutes also provided for
the forfeiture of pirate ships. These early statutes permitted the government
to proceed in rem under the fiction that the thing itself, rather than the
owner, was guilty of the crime. And, because these suits were in rem rather
than in personam, they typically proceeded civilly rather than criminally.181
However, Justice Thomas further noted how the historical forfeiture laws were
significantly narrower than modern ones.182 Based on the large evidence of abuse of
power under civil asset forfeiture laws across the country, it is unlikely that the seizure
of an individual’s property, without being required or even charging them with a
crime, was in line with the Framers of the Constitution’s idea of “property rights.”
Americans have a right to presumed innocence, making the idea of the government’s

177

See supra text accompanying notes 119–26.

178 In Leonard v. Texas, Justice Thomas noted, “Whether forfeiture is characterized
as civil or criminal carries important implications for a variety of procedural protections,
including the right to a jury trial and the proper standard of proof. Indeed, as relevant in this
case, there is some evidence that the government was historically required to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 848, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
179 Paul A. Avron, Constitutional Issues Concerning Civil Forfeiture, THE FEDERAL
LAWYER
(Jan./Feb.
2010),
http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-LawyerMagazine/2018/JanuaryFebruary/Features/Constitutional-Issues-Concerning-CivilForfeiture.aspx?FT=.pdf.
180

Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas, J., concurring).

181

Id. at 848–49.

182

Id. at 849.
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seizing property without due process incompatible with the Constitution and our
founding principles.183
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have the potential to entrap innocent citizens,
which is always a significant risk lawmakers want to avoid. Further, “forfeiture
operations frequently target the poor and other groups least able to defend their
interests.”184 Low income individuals are the same groups most burdened by forfeiture
because they are more likely to use cash than alternative forms of payment, such as
credit cards, which may be less susceptible to forfeiture. 185 They are also more likely
to suffer in their daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item of
property, such as a car or a home. 186
B. Plan B: Implement Further Restrictions within Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised
Code
Unjust forfeitures in Ohio continue and existing laws still incentivize law
enforcement agencies to focus their efforts on revenue generation. 187 Requiring
criminal convictions in Ohio prior to permitting the seizure of an asset will
permanently deter Ohio law enforcement officials from further partaking in corrupt
forfeiture practices against law abiding citizens. If Ohio lawmakers are unable to fully
outlaw civil asset forfeiture in Ohio, the following revisions to Section 2981 of the
Ohio Revised Code will move Ohio as far in that direction as possible. The necessary
revisions to Section 2981 include removing incentives for Ohio law enforcement
officials to perform civil asset forfeitures, raising the burden of proof the government
must meet in these proceedings, and enhancing reporting requirements.
1. Remove Incentives for Ohio Law Enforcement
“There’s this myth that they’re cracking down on drug cartels and kingpins,” Lee
McGrath, of the Institute for Justice says. 188 “In reality, it’s small amounts, where
people aren’t entitled to a public defender, and can’t afford a lawyer, and the only
rational response is to walk away from your property, because of the infeasibility of
getting your money back.”189 To discourage civil asset forfeiture in Ohio, lawmakers
should ban state and local law enforcement from participating in the “equitable
sharing” program created by the CCCA. 190 The current applicable section of the Ohio
revised code permits state and local law enforcement to participate in these “equitable
sharing” programs when the asset(s) in question are valued at or more than
183

Watt & Richardson, supra note 2.

184

Carpenter, supra note 23, at 53–54; Sallah, supra note 35.

185

Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848.

186 Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional, Violates
The
Eighth
Amendment,
FORBES
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2018/06/19/supreme-court-will-decide-if-civilforfeiture-is-unconstitutional-violates-the-eighth-amendment/#54f6560c7165.
187

Carpenter, supra note 24, at 3.

188

Stillman, supra note 59.

189

Id.

190

See supra text accompanying notes 64–68.
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$100,000.191 Permitting participation in the equitable sharing program effectively
warrants state and local law enforcement to continue to seize citizens’ property even
in the face of local bans on the practice, as long as they refer the case to a federal
agency after the seizure.192
Additionally, Ohio legislators should raise the
current $15,000 restriction on civil asset forfeiture to $100,000 or higher. The current
$15,000 limit is entirely too low and can deprive individuals, of life savings, their only
means of transportation, their homes, and large sums of cash saved up for important
medical procedures.193 The statute should be revised to truly target those drug lords
and criminals that civil asset forfeiture laws were directed towards. Lastly, the state’s
lawmakers should require that all funds law enforcement agencies acquire during
forfeiture proceedings be redirected to a general state fund. Thus, removing the
incentive to over seize assets to pad budgets.
2. Raise the Burden of Proof
Ohio’s recent reform heightened the government’s burden of proof to the “clear
and convincing evidence” standard.194 Unfortunately, this increased burden of proof is
still not at the level required during a criminal trial. As civil asset forfeiture
proceedings are conducted on the premise that the property in question was involved
in the commission of a crime or is proceeds thereof, the burden of proof should be that
required in a criminal trial. This is especially important as civil asset forfeiture
proceedings do not provide property owners with the right to counsel or trial by jury,195
therefore, requiring the highest level of proof in these cases is in the best interest of
property owner’s rights. Expenses could be avoided and judicial efficiency increased
by simply outlawing civil asset forfeiture altogether, instead of having to determine
the appropriate standard of proof.
3. Promote Transparency
“Most state and federal forfeiture laws lack even the most basic reporting
requirements, leaving their constituents in the dark regarding most forfeiture
activity.”196 Inadequate reporting standards make it nearly impossible to hold law
enforcement agencies accountable.197 Based on a study conducted by the Institute of
Justice, only fourteen states report on forfeiture revenues for an extended period.198
Ohio eliminated its reporting requirements in 2012. 199 Constituents should demand
that lawmakers reinstate these reporting requirements to promote transparency.

191

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.14(B) (West 2017).

192

Stillman, supra note 59.

193 See supra text accompanying note 22; see, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 24; Sallah, supra
note 35; Stillman, supra note 59.
194

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017).
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See supra text accompanying note 42.
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Carpenter, supra note 24, at 7.
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Id.

198

Id. at 5.
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Id. at 116.
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V. CONCLUSION: OHIO CITIZENS MUST DEMAND CHANGE
To protect Ohioan’s constitutional property rights afforded by Article I, Section
14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the strongest solution is to outlaw civil asset forfeiture in Ohio.
Therefore, Ohio citizens must lobby for lawmakers to amend Section 2981.05 of the
Ohio Revised Code to require a criminal conviction prior to allowing forfeiture
proceedings to commence, regardless of the value of property in question.
As civil asset forfeiture is a topic that has gained lawmakers attention only
recently, with one of the most notorious studies on the subject being published in
2010,200 persuading an entire state legislature to outlaw a practice viewed so favorably
by law enforcement may be too daunting a task for Ohio lawmakers. This is especially
true after substantial reform occurring only early in 2017. That is not to say additional
reform to Section 2981 is not still needed. Ohio constituents must raise these concerns
with their local lawmakers and stand up for their constitutional property rights.

200

Williams, supra note 36.
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